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Abstract: 
Without any doubt, François Perroux is one of the most important European economists of the 
20st century. Today, in English-speaking countries, François Perroux is recognized mostly for his 
original contributions in the field of spatial economics and economics of development. However, 
taking into account the variety of his contributions, Perroux deserves certainly more attention. 
This paper underlines a less well-known  aspect  of Perroux’s works: his illuminating views on 
asymmetry, domination and power which can be considered a source of works carried out in this 
field half a century later, such as the American realist and neo-realist approaches to power or the 
concept of structural power developed by Susan Strange. 
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1. Introduction 
Unquestionably, François Perroux  is one of  the most original European economists of  the 20st 
century. He was a prolific author. His innovations are many, ranging from spatial economics in 
which  he  analyzed  the  economics  of  location,  the  forces  of  agglomeration  and  dispersion  of 
polarization and diffusion (Perroux, 1949),  to  the analysis of economic development,  including 
an interesting attempt to develop an alternative approach to the general equilibrium, based on the 
recognition of the active role of agents (Perroux, 1975 and 1976). Despite a considerable work, 
François Perroux  is not  really appreciated  to  its  true value. Perroux’  ideas  reached  the apex of 
their popularity during the 1960s, namely in Europe and Latin America. Benjamin Higgins, for 
example notes  that he was nominated several  times for  the Nobel Prize (Higgins, 1988).  In his 
famous book: The Development of Economic Thought, W. Spiegel considers Perroux to be “the 
only  living  economist  who  developed  a  theoretical  system  rivaling  conventional  equilibrium 
economics”  (Spiegel,  1952).  Similarly,  John  B.  Parr  underlines  that  during  this  decade,  the 
perrouxian concepts of “Growth poles” and “development poles” were adopted enthusiastically 
by  regional  economy  analysts  and planners  (Parr,  1999). A  similar  judgement was given more 
recently by Stephen Meardon (2001). Even though the assessments of Higging, Spiegel and many 
others do not represent a clear consensus they clearly suggest that at that time Perroux was held 
in high regard by many of his peers. 
Since then, Perroux’ thinking gradually sank into oblivion, namely in English­speaking countries. 
Part  of  the  reason  for  that  is  related  to  the  fact  that  Perroux  did  not  publish  a  lot  in  English. 
Actually, he published in many different languages: Spanish, Italian, German, Portuguese, Polish, 
Hungarian, Rumanian, Japanese, even in Esperanto. But, among the 689 publications registered 
in  his  less  incomplete  bibliography  compiled  by  Michel  Chai1  less  than  3%  were  initially 
published  or  subsequently  translated  or  reprinted  in  English.  Surprisingly,  works  such  as  La 
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Coexistence  pacifique  (Perroux,  1958),  Economie  et  Société.  Contrainte,  échange  et  don 
(Perroux,  1960),  Pouvoir  et  Economie  (1973) and even his masterpiece L’Economie  du  XXe 
siècle (1961) have never been translated into English. 
However, more  recently,  some  of  the main  ideas  that  Perroux  defended  so  forcefully  seem  to 
experience  renewed  interest.  The  Nobel  prize  awarded  to  Krugman  with  whom  Perroux  is 
frequently associated can be considered a proof of this revival. 
Among the various topics to which Perroux made important contributions, the most insightful 
and not so well recognized one is his “domination effect” and his analysis of power. This paper 
aims  at  underlining  Perroux’s  innovative  views  on  asymmetry,  domination  and  power.  More 
precisely, my objective is to bring to light how and why his contributions can be considered a 
source of works carried out in this field half a century later. 
When, in 1948, François Perroux wrote his famous article “Esquisse d’une théorie de l’économie 
dominante”  (Perroux, 1948, 1950),  he was obviously influenced by the economic and political 
context of the times. In 1945, the United States had become the dominant economy in the world, 
and it seemed destined to remain so for many years to come (Perroux, 1953). A superficial 
reading of this seminal article might lead one to believe that Perroux had restricted himself to 
constructing  a  theoretical  architecture,  based  on  this  single  concrete  example.  But  Perroux’s 
range of interest was considerably broader. 
In the present as in the past, an analysis of the effect of domination on international relations 
tightly conditions our knowledge of current affairs. After the Second World War, lopsided power 
relations induced trade imbalances and generated an irreversible orientation of trade and financial 
flows that was apparently incompatible with the creation of a new international economic 
multilateralism. At the same time, the chronic shortage in international liquidities raised 
formidable threats to the viability of the Bretton Woods arrangement. Creditors seemed to remain 
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perpetual creditors; debtors became more and more indebted. 
The domination effect and the concept of the internationally dominant economy offer particularly 
penetrating views of the new world that was being built in the early second half of the 
20th century. The scope of Perroux’s analysis, however,  is of a completely different nature. As 
this paper shows, it is much larger and more ambitious. 
Our purpose, in the following pages, is to conduct an in­depth analysis of the content of Perroux's 
concepts  of  domination,  dominance  and  power  and  to  examine  how  these  seminal  ideas  were 
precisely implemented in Perroux's works, empirical and theoretical. To that end, I want first to 
stress  the  operational  character  of  Perroux’s  concepts  of  asymmetry,  domination (and 
dominance), and power. Even if some of his writings can be considered highly theoretical and 
philosophical, the major and permanent concern of Perroux throughout his entire work was to 
design analyses leading to a better understanding of the world in which we live. His entire body 
of work bore witness to the imperative upon which he unremittingly insisted: a symbiosis 
between the “theoretician’s discourse” and the “observer’s discourse” (section 2). Then I describe 
more thoroughly the relations between structures and power (section 3) and the difference 
introduced in Perroux’s later publications between domination and dominance (section 4). 
The  most  interesting  aspect  of  Perroux’s  thinking  is  that  the  domination  effect  represents  a 
common denominator and a key to interpreting a multiplicity of apparently heterogeneous 
phenomena (section 5).  This  concept  is  probably  what  confers  upon  Perroux’s  work  its 
overarching character and its pioneering feature (section 6). The components of power relations 
called asymmetries, inequalities, and irreversibilities therefore constitute central themes and 
structural elements. For Perroux, they are the main building blocks of any attempt to the 
renovation of the general equilibrium theory which he considered a necessity along with a new 
way of looking at human beings and society (section 7). 
  Page 5      
2. The Concept of Power and the Domination E ffect 
Starting with Max Weber, Perroux defines power as “the probability that an agent within a social 
relation will be in a situation  to make  his  own will  effective,  in  spite  of  resistances  (…)  The 
essence of power, sought after, used, expected, or predicted, is an asymmetric relationship that 
stems  from  unequal  actions  and  reactions”  (Perroux,  1973:  30).  This  asymmetry  of  influence, 
which he calls the domination effect, can exist between various units: individuals, firms, social 
groups, nations, and others. 
It is useful at the outset to quote Perroux’s own definition: “To consider just two economic units, 
we would say that A exercises a domination effect over B, when, in the absence of any particular 
intention, A exerts a certain influence on B without the reverse being true or true to the same 
degree. A dissymmetry or irreversibility of principle or degree is constitutive of this effect” 
(1948: 248). As an imperfect form of reciprocity and interdependence, the domination effect is 
therefore not necessarily the expression of a desire for power. It may also be the consequence of 
an existing situation – the result of differences in size and disparities in structure. 
According to F. Perroux, the domination effect has three essential components. The first one is 
the relative sizes of the units, including factor components, assets, respective contributions to 
supply and demand, information available, and so on. The second one is the bargaining power – 
the units’ respective abilities to negotiate conditions and exchange rates, or even to set the rules 
of the game. Lastly, a unit’s domination effect results from its belonging to an active zone, the 
position that it occupies in that zone, and the nature of the activity that it exercises. Of the three 
above components, the last one is the least intuitive. It is, however, fundamental. The implication 
is that the strength or domination of one unit is not reduced exclusively to its individual features, 
but results from synergies and externalities – from the connection between the unit and its 
“environment.” For this reason, Perroux’ multifaceted concepts of dominance and power have a 
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lot of empirical applications. At the level of the firm, among several possible illustrations, the 
perrouxian growth poles analysis is based on the central role of the propulsive firms whose 
innovative capacity and leadership exert an asymmetrical (but stimulating) influence on other 
firms (Vázquez­Barquero  A.,  2002). This analysis gave rise to growth pole policies. At the 
macroeconomic level, one possible illustration of the domination effect is the “macro-decisions” 
of the governments (see below 2.2). But, obviously, the international level is the most important 
application field of power relations (see below 2.1 and 3.). 
2.1. Unintentional Domination 
Unit A exerts a dissymmetrical influence on other decision-making centers, even though it has no 
desire to act on them, by increasing or decreasing its production or by changing its prices. The 
other units must adjust  to A’s decision by changing,  in  turn,  their  level  of activity and/or  their 
prices, without these reactions affecting or influencing A to the same degree. 
This effect can be clearly observed when we examine, for example, how changes in the monetary 
or budgetary policy of the United States affect the circumstances of its partners. The domination 
effect may take the form of a cumulative sequence of asymmetrical influences in concentric 
rings. For instance, a restrictive monetary policy conducted in the United States to reduce 
domestic inflationary pressures forces other industrialized countries to align themselves by 
raising their interest rates. Attempts at disconnection almost always prove to be impractical, 
except through rigorous control of the exchange rate (this is the first circle of asymmetry). The 
corresponding rise in international interest rates then induces a more strongly asymmetrical 
influence on developing countries, which are indebted at a floating rate, by increasing the service 
of their debt (this is the second circle of asymmetry). 
An internationally dominant economy thus appears to be a “relatively autonomous” conjunctural 
centre of momentum, which, independent from any hegemonic intentions, influences the 
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situations of its partners. In a world that is de facto increasingly globalized, the interplay of 
irreversible and dissymmetrical influences develops both directly and indirectly along more or 
less complex chains (or sequences) of domination effects. 
The market for Eurodollars is a cogent example. During the critical period of dislocation of the 
international currency system (late 1960s and early 1970s), the Eurodollar market undeniably 
served as a communication channel for an indirect domination effect. Unintentional at first, it 
relayed the influence of the American monetary market to other national monetary markets, 
especially with regard to determination of interest rates and pressures on exchange rates. This 
asymmetry in the constraints exerted on (or exerted by) foreign monetary markets was to some 
extent determined by the comparative sizes (masses) of the respective markets at that time (see 
figure 1). 
Figure 1. Relative masses of monetary markets2 
 
Not only are the unintentional asymmetrical relations of A and B evident in terms of quantitative 
magnitudes of flows and prices, but they may also result from asymmetrical structural changes. A 
structural change made by unit A, even with no desire to affect unit B, imposes structural 
transformations on the latter with little or no reciprocity. 
Analogous linkage, distribution, attraction, and polarization effects – or, on the contrary, 
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inhibition, braking, or blockage effects – can easily be observed between a variety of units: first, 
between competing firms through innovations, industrial or financial concentration, choice of 
production diversification, and so on; secondly, between industries, for which interdependences 
are never symmetrical. Some industries exert asymmetrical induction effects on costs, prices, 
productivity, and the dynamics of technological change on activities both upstream and 
downstream. (Static inter-industrial matrices of goods and services record these effects only very 
imperfectly). Third, these effects are observable between regions that are unequally able to 
mutually supply net consumption or investment flows (taking account of their respective weights 
and urban agglomerations), and also have an unequal capacity to induce growth and attract 
material, human, and financial resources. Fourth, they are observable between nations, which are 
unequally capable of causing cyclic variations. Lastly, to these effects are added asymmetries that 
may arise between units of different nature, such as between large firms and their regions, 
between the capital city and the regions, between urban areas and countryside, and so on. 
2.2. Intentional Domination 
The domination effect may also be exerted deliberately and in an even more obvious way. In 
contrast to unintentional domination, the study of intentional asymmetrical actions involves the 
subject’s plan,  the advantages  it  seeks and obtains, its desire for power, and its field of action. 
Perroux (1973: 31 and seq.) distinguishes three modalities of power relationships corresponding 
to three kinds of intentional domination effects. 
- Influence. Influence means that Unit A tries to change the behaviour of unit B without force, 
through persuasion, using its authority to encourage participation or imitation. Thus, A exerts 
over B a power “beyond its capacity to force the other to do or not to do” (Perroux, 1973: 31). 
The phenomenon of the leader firm, as has long been observed, for example, in global nickel and 
aluminum oligopolistic markets, is characteristic of this type of influence. Without being forced, 
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firms explicitly or tacitly align their decisions regarding prices, production, investment, and other 
activities with choices made by one of them, which plays the role of barometric firm (Stigler, 
1947). A similar situation arises with regard to social conditioning of consumption linked to 
Duesenberry’s ratchet effect and the respective effects exerted by “influence merchants” (through 
advertising and the media) on consumers and citizens. 
- Imposition or coercion. Through the use of force or violence, A forces B “to do” or “not to do.” 
The field of action may be more or less extensive. It may be manifested between decision-making 
units or between groups of social actors or classes. It is seen primarily in, for example, relations 
between the metropolis and its colonies and is most transparently the result of macro-decisions 
(Perroux, 1949 and 1961) made by the government, as a “monopolizer of legitimized violence” 
(Perroux, 1961: 377). It may also take place between private actors, particularly in the form of 
“production  prices”  (set  and  imposed  unilaterally  for  a  time  by  a  firm  or  group  of  firms). 
However, it is most visible in international relations (embargoes, blockades, prohibitions, 
reprisals, retaliation, and the like). 
- Subordination. According  to  Perroux,  “subordination  involves  the  duration  of  the  coercive 
action by A (individual or group) on B (individual or group). This is the area of structural 
influence, institutionalized or not” (Perroux, 1973: 32) – that is, an orbiting process linked to the 
combination of all of A’s asymmetrical actions with regard to B, which tend to substitute (more 
or less completely) the decision-making power of the former for that of the latter (Perroux, 1969). 
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3. Structures and Power 
Of course, the distinction between intentional and unintentional domination effects does not 
mean that these two “varieties” are mutually incompatible or independent. Although Eugen von 
Böhm-Bawerk (1914), in Macht order ökonomisches Gesetz rejects the subordination of human 
beings to a structural determinism that destroys their quality as actors, he tries to show that the 
“influence of power” (Machteinfluss) is exerted even more easily and durably when it is based on 
a  “position  of  power”  (Machtstellung)  that  respects  and  uses  economic  laws.  Perroux’s 
asymmetry analysis provides a powerful tool, with the domination effect, towards a better 
understanding of the  complex  relations  between  “structures”  and  “power”.  Two  examples  can 
illustrate these relations. 
- Trade in raw materials. Industrialized countries and raw material producing countries have 
unequal capacity to influence trade and international markets. Indisputably, raw material 
producers would be less vulnerable and their negotiating power would be stronger if: (i) they 
were not so hyper-specialized (sometimes mono-specialized), as opposed to the diffused 
specialization of industrial countries. (ii) If industrialized countries were not so dangerous 
competitors in the export of raw materials. Contrary to a received idea, the most important 
exporters in raw materials (agricultural and mineral) are developed countries. (iii) If they were 
not sometimes forced to sell at any price, and were less dependent on markets in industrialized 
countries and on foreign firms. Transnational firms also intentionally structure relationships. 
- Location strategy of transnational firms. In some particular industrial sectors, transnational 
groups  sometimes  apply  what  may  be  called  a  strategy  of  “specialization/diversification”  in 
which each of their subsidiaries is made into an ultra-specialized plant. In this strategy, the 
transnational firm spreads the geographic distribution of its subsidiary plants in different 
countries for each stage of the production process. For example, one subsidiary of a car 
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manufacturer will produce only brake pads, and this part will be manufactured simultaneously in 
Mexico, Brazil, and Asia. 
This particular strategy is obviously a case of intentional implementation of structural power 
relations. It leads, among other things, to a productive and spatial structure that generates 
domination effects between the firm’s management and the government and social groups in the 
host country. It minimizes the effects on the firm of potential technical, political, or social 
incidents. It dissuades host countries from nationalizing foreign firms established on their soil, 
since each “plant” is viable only within the industrial group upon which it is totally dependent. It 
also protects the industrial group against the consequences of strikes, which are not 
internationally coordinated. On the other hand, this structure makes the group’s threat or counter-
threat of lock-out or closure credible to both unions and local governments, since a local 
production stoppage does not disrupt the group’s activity (Sandretto, 1995). 
These two examples clearly illustrate that power relations do not come out of the blue, but that 
they may be structurally determined. 
4. Domination and Dominance 
In his later writings, Perroux has refined his analysis of the domination effect with the distinction 
between  ‘domination’  and  ‘dominance’  depending on  the  intensity  and  extent  of  asymmetrical 
relations (Perroux, 1975): 
- Dominance is a degree of asymmetry that cannot be evaded over a given period, resulting from 
the asymmetry in the respective influences, which is such that Unit A exerts an influence on B, 
while B exerts an influence on A but not at the same degree. 
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- At the opposite, domination (strictly speaking) is corresponding to an intrinsic dissymmetry of 
principle (total irreversibility, always within a given period). In other words, domination would 
correspond to total dominance. Perroux also sometimes used the term domination to designate 
crystallized dominance in structures and institutions. 
Analytically, dominance is more interesting than domination, as it has a greater range. As 
F. Perroux wrote  in  a  personal  correspondence with  the  author  “Total dominance of A over B 
destroys (economically) duality” (Perroux, 1975b) because it suppresses B’s quality as an actor – 
its decision-making capacity, individuality, and integrity. This may be why Perroux abandoned 
the expression of domination (and “domination effect”) for the more general one of “dominance” 
in his later writings. 
The main problem resides in the difficulty of measuring the intensity and effectiveness of the 
dominance effect. Expressing it in the most general terms, Perroux characterized the search for 
the most useful result possible in the behaviour of two units, A and B, in a relationship of pure 
trade. This point is reached when A and B equalize the marginal return obtained and the marginal 
return ceded: 
1
cededreturn  Marginal
obtainedreturn  Marginal
  
The impact of the dominance effect, according to Perroux, is evaluated by the external advantage 
of pure trade – by the proportion within which the respective performances of A and B may 
deviate from the above standard of optimality and equity. The breadth of the dominance effect 
may thus be quantified by the price supplement that A imposes on B above the marginal cost of 
the good that it is selling or by the difference between the remuneration to the holder of a 
production factor and that factor’s maximum marginal productivity. 
Following a similar approach, the international neoclassical equilibrium model described by 
Heckscher, Ohlin, and Samuelson (the HOS model) can be interpreted as the standard of equal 
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trade, conflictually neutral, from which all dominance relations are axiomatically excluded 
(Sandretto, 1976). Measurement of economic power by deviation from the model of pure trade 
(or the ideal model of perfect competition) is both simple and attractive on the conceptual level. 
But is it the most operative and significant in practice? According to Perroux, the answer is no, 
because it refers not to a particular concrete situation, but to an unrealistic model – a fictitious 
one. 
5. Power , keystone of the Per rouxian analysis 
In L’Économie du XXe Siècle (Perroux, 1961), Perroux shows the importance of the dominance 
effect within his work. The structure itself of this book reflects this prominence. 
This major work begins, in fact, with a section devoted to the dominant economy (Part 1). It is 
followed by a study of spatial, linkage, and agglomeration asymmetries – in other words, the 
formalization of the growth poles which are a direct application of the dominance theory (Part 2). 
Then comes the concept of macro-decisions, a clear example of the structural decision-making 
power of a dominant actor: with the help of the irreversible and asymmetrical influence that it is 
capable of exerting, the macro-decision imposes the rules of the game on and shapes the 
environment of the other units (Part 3). The analysis then turns to the process of development and 
underdevelopment, which is dependent on the coupling mechanisms that link the various parties 
in the global economy and the asymmetries that it supports (Part 4). This process leads to the 
identification of the forces of dynamism and progress, the main one of which is the search for 
power  (a  motivation  “as  powerful  as  the  search  for  well-being  or  monetary  gain”  [Part 5]). 
Economic movements are accomplished by human beings, innovation, and power. They result 
from the intersection of the behaviours of “diversely and unequally active” units (Part 6). We can 
thus see that dissymmetries and irreversibilities of power relations, far from being dispersed 
instruments in an analytic toolbox, are essential aspects of an overall interpretation. 
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In this work – no doubt Perroux’s most important synthesis – the dominance effect appears to be 
the common denominator in most of his key concepts. Later, it became the bedrock of an overall 
theoretical reformulation and of his last project: the construction of a theory of general 
equilibration (Perroux, 1975). 
The concept of economic power elaborated by Perroux is deduced from his analysis of 
asymmetries,  irreversibilities,  and  constraint  “in  a  universe  of  actors.”  It  is  no  exaggeration  to 
state that this concept of dominance is the cement that gives his complex body of work its 
coherence. 
6. A prefiguration of the most recent analyses of power 
Perroux’s concept of power can be compared to more recent concepts of power. In the American 
neo-realist approach, power is relational. First, in a context of strong asymmetries, power can be 
applied through constraints. In the contemporary American neo-realist analysis, power is defined 
as the capacity of unit A (state, firm) to directly force unit B to do what it would not have done 
spontaneously, in order to better satisfy the interests of unit A. This is called hard power, because 
it relies on the comparative strengths of units A and B: military power, natural resources, 
demography, capacity to inflict damage on another or to avoid such damage. The “hard power” is 
one of the key concepts of the American neo-realist school of thought, whose one of the most 
prominent representative is Kenneth Walz (1979). In contrast to this, the American liberal 
institutional approach has emphasized the quite different concept of soft power based on cultural 
ideological and political attraction, and on the attractiveness of the way of life of the leading 
country(ies) (Nye 1990: 167). Actually, in the globalized multipolar and complex world in which 
we are living, the reinforcement of global interdependences creates a situation such that 
hegemonic (hard) power is increasingly difficult to exert. Force cannot always easily impose 
power. Power then tends to change in nature. Leading states attempt more and more frequently to 
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exert influence through other instruments than military force or economic constraint, using state’s 
capacity to seduce, convince, or yet induce through cultural and/or ideological attraction. More 
than traditional means, soft power is based on intangible assets (culture, way of life). 
Another important recent contribution to power analysis has been achieved by Susan Strange. 
Similarly to François Perroux, Susan Strange suggested a structural approach of power, that is a 
concept of power basically linked to structures and, more generally, to the environment in which 
agents’  actions  take  place.  She  defines  power  as  the  capacity  of  an  individual  or  a  group  to 
influence a situation in such a way that the preferences of the individual or group have priority 
over  others’  preferences (Strange, 1996). In other words, power is the capacity to conceive, 
legitimize, implement, and control rules for individual and collective action. This amounts to the 
capacity to shape structures within which other actors will have to evolve. The Strangeian 
concept of power is also structural in so far as it relies on structural components. 
Strange suggests four basic power structures: 
1. Security structures, the way in which each society organizes and manages its protection 
against various risks (wars, terrorist threats, natural catastrophes, epidemics, food and 
environmental security) 
2. Production structures (e.g., multinationals, innovation) 
3. Financial structures (with financial globalization) 
4. Knowledge structure, a domain in which asymmetries of acquisition and holding of 
knowledge have increased dramatically with recent changes in communication technology 
On the basis of these concepts, Strange puts forward two major theses: first, she contests the 
thesis of a U.S. decline. Second, all states (including the United States) see their capacity to act 
on society and the economy decline in comparison with private actors. Therefore, zones of 
ungovernance – spheres in which neither state nor non-state actors can master events (in 
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particular in the field of finance and the environment) – evolve. Consequently, S. Strange 
considered that if the most important global risk in the long run is related to environment, the 
closest risk of global crisis will have to do with the world financial system and a risk of systemic 
financial global crisis. Obviously, the current financial crisis has vindicated this forecast. 
The above brief contextualization of approaches  to power shows  the extent  to which Perroux’s 
own approach was seminal. Half a century earlier, Perroux had framed an approach that 
incorporates American neo-realism, liberal institutionalism and the Strangeian approaches, each 
of them appearing as specific cases of this Perrouxian unified theoretical framework, since this 
last one includes both relational and structural powers. Perroux’ point of view suggests that hard 
power, soft power and structural powers can be regarded as different aspects of a more general 
conceptualization. 
Indeed, it is easy to recognize the hard power as a modern expression of imposition or coercion, 
while the soft power is quite similar to influence in the Perrouxian typology. Similarly, structural 
power, as described by Strange, is reminiscent of unintentional dominance along with the 
Perrouxian suggestion that intentional dominance can rely on unintentional dominance. In both 
Perroux and Strange we can also find the idea that power relationships are structurally 
conditioned. 
7. Conclusion 
Perroux’s  acceptance  at  the  outset  of  asymmetrical  and  irreversible  actions  explains  why  his 
analysis was so strongly distinct from the major traditional currents of economic analysis. It may 
also explain why his analysis sank into a relative oblivion during so many years. In several 
publications, Perroux criticized the various processes whereby the mainstream economic analysis 
eludes the power relationship, namely: 
- the waterproof partitioning between economics (often considered a science of means) and 
  Page 
17 
 
   
politics (as a science of ends), which leads to a tendency to associate power only with 
government power and extract it from the economic sphere (belonging to the private sector), 
- the rudimentary separation of economic relations (superficially conceived as merchant relations 
governed by private profitability) and social relations (often trivially considered an obstacle or a 
corrective to economic activities), 
- the separation of economic variables (prices and quantities) from extra-economic data (rules of 
the game, institutions, ownership regimes, power relations, and so forth). 
Finally, Perroux was fundamentally opposed to reductionist simplifications – the neoclassicists’ 
irenicism  (total  absence  of  conflicts)  and  the Marxists’  polemicism  (unavoidable  confrontation 
between two inherently antagonistic classes) (Perroux, 1970: 2271). For Perroux, all exchanges 
are of a hybrid nature: they mix free and reciprocal transfers and power relations (Perroux, 1973). 
Economic relations, as any social relations, intimately blend conflict and co-operation.  
One of the main questionings that we find in several publications of Perroux was: can the 
neoclassical model be amended? François Perroux believed that the very foundations of the 
model were defective. In his opinion, the neoclassical theory would not be improved by the 
introduction of power, for it would certainly then be ruined. In short, according to an aphorism 
that  Perroux  borrowed  from Oskar Morgenstern:  "there  is  no  road  from  L. Walras  to  reality" 
(1988b,  p. 83). Thus, he considered that a complete reconstruction on other foundations was 
necessary. Of course, this conclusion is debatable. However, it still remains that despite 
important recent improvements related namely to the game theory, the general equilibrium theory 
did not really succeed in taking into account this “rebellious exile” as Perroux described power. 
The integration of power in the heart of economic analysis is still a challenge. 
Perroux tried to perform this reconstruction by replacing equilibrium with equilibration of active 
units’ energy  for change: “Equilibration  is  a chain of decisions and acts over a period of time. 
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The state that we call equilibrium is the more or less durable persistence of sequences conveying, 
under explicit structural constraints, the cross-compatibility  of  actors’  projects  and  activities” 
(Perroux, 1975: 148). Thus reformulated, the general equilibration of an economic set is attained 
when the sum of the actors’ energies for change is close to zero. 
Unfortunately, this theoretical reconstruction project is both uncompleted and incomplete. As a 
result, it leaves the reader frustrated not to find something more revolutionary which would really 
replace the Walrasian  approach. As Stephen J. Meardon judiciously points out the model 
developed  by  Perroux  in  1975  “is  not  specified  mathematically”.  Perroux’  representation  has 
nothing to do with “a mathematically specified general equilibrium model that fulfills  the same 
functions  as  the Walrasian  model,  but  in  addition  captures  the  exercise  of  market  and  extra­
market power that the Walrasian model entirely misses”. 
The fact that Perroux failed to achieve a complete theoretical alternative reconstruction to the 
general equilibrium model does not condemn the project itself and its necessity. It does not 
invalidate in any way Perroux's  ideas. His last book published in 1975 is full of intuitions and 
suggestions aimed at transforming the concept of general economic equilibrium from its initial 
description as a balance of forces applying to objects (to robots) towards a representation which 
incorporates the active role of economic agents and their power relations. In other words, towards 
the modelling of a process which tends to make compatible agents’ plans as well as the change 
energies that they develop individually and collectively. 
The fact that this project has not been brought to a successful conclusion is a limitation indeed. 
However, in one sense, it also remains a potential: an invitation to present and future generations 
to resist mental laziness and follow and explore the rocky path that Perroux opened up. 
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Notes 
1. Unpublished document. 
2.  In  1974,  the  size  of  the American monetary market was  around  20  times  as  big  as  the 
Eurodollar market. At  that  time, we  could  consider  the Eurodollar  to  be  some  kind  of  second 
Federal Reserve System. Since then, the situation has completely changed:  the Eurodollar grew 
much more  rapidly  than  the American monetary market  and  the  respective masses  reversed  in 
1981 (Sandretto, 1993) 
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